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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Many households received rebate checks in 2001 as advanced payments
of the benefit of the new 10 percent federal income tax bracket. A survey
conducted at the time the rebates were mailed finds that few households
said that the rebate led them mostly to increase spending. A follow-up
survey in 2002 as well as a similar survey conducted after the attacks of
9/11 also indicates low spending rates. This paper investigates the ro-
bustness of these survey responses and evaluates whether such surveys
are useful for policy evaluation. It also draws lessons from the surveys
for macroeconomic analysis of the tax rebate.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
As part of the 10-year tax cut bill passed by Congress in the spring of
2001, tax rebate checks for as much as $600 were mailed to American
We are grateful to Peter Katuscak and Hui Shan for expert research assistance. The Survey
Research Center and the Office of Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan Business
School supported data collection for this project.84 Shapiro & Slemrod
households beginning in late July and continuing until late September.
Although the tax rebate was not originally conceived as an anti-recession-
ary policy, by the spring of 2001, this justification was one of several of-
fered for the tax cut and for delivering part of it in this visible form.
According to the standard Keynesian model, the tax rebate would be
more effective if it generated an increase in the amount of consumption.
How effective was it in meeting this goal? The Bush administration cer-
tainly claimed that it was effective in providing a substantial short-run
stimulus to the economy. According to a Council of Economic Advisers
white paper released in early 2002, it "provided valuable stimulus to eco-
nomic activity in the short run. The quick enactment last year of the Presi-
dent's tax relief plan softened the recessionary headwinds in 2001 and
has helped to put the economy on the road to recovery in 2002."
This paper has three objectives. First, we review survey evidence re-
garding how effective the tax rebate was in generating consumption and
thereby potentially countering an incipient recession. We focus on the
results of three consumer surveys: one conducted while the rebates were
being received; one conducted for a separate group of people concerning
a hypothetical, temporary rebate; and a third conducted six months later
in which there is significant overlap of respondents from the first survey.
Second, we address the reliability of consumer survey evidence and how
it squares with other macroeconomic indicators of the effectiveness of the
tax rebate. Finally, we assess how our survey evidence on the spending
rate of the tax rebate bears on estimates of the short-run aggregate impact
of the 2001 policy.
1.2 The 2001 Tax Rebate
1
Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,
taxpayers were entitled to a rebate in tax year 2001 of up to $300 for single
individuals and up to $600 in the case of a married couple filing a joint
return. Most taxpayers received this payment in the form of a check issued
by the Department of the Treasury. These checks were sent out beginning
the week of July 23, 2001, and ending the week of September 24, 2001.
Which week a taxpayer received the check depended on the second-to-
last digit of their Social Security number.
The tax rebate that we study corresponded to a new 10 percent income
tax bracket for a portion of taxable income that was previously taxed at
15 percent, effective for taxable years beginning January 1, 2001. The tax
rebate scheme was designed to deliver the benefit of the new 10 percent
1 The description of the rebate program and the first survey draws on Shapiro and Slemrod
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income tax rate in a highly visible way during calendar year 2001. The
10 percent bracket applied to the first $6,000 of taxable income for single
individuals, $10,000 of taxable income for heads of household, and
$12,000 for married couples filing joint returns. Thus, the maximum rebate
for a married couple filing jointly was 5 percent of $12,000, or $600. The
rebates for taxpayers with other marital status were calculated in the same
manner.
The tax rebates were substantial, both from the point of view of an
average household or in aggregate. The Treasury calculated that 92 mil-
lion received a rebate check, with 72 million receiving the maximum
amount for their marital status. The rebates amounted to $38 billion, or
approximately 0.4 percent of 2001 gross domestic product (GDP). Median
family income in 2000 was about $41,000, so a $600 rebate represents
about 1.5 percent of median annual income and a greater share of dispos-
able income for a typical household. The size of the rebate was capped.
Thus, the fraction of income represented by the rebate decreased as in-
come rose once a family received the maximum rebate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
our survey methodology and our findings about the spending rate from
the tax rebate. Section 3 discusses some of the criticisms of and potential
problems with surveys. We use results from the follow-up surveys to ad-
dress the validity of survey responses. Section 4 examines aggregate eco-
nomic outcomes and how our survey results inform them. Section 5 offers
our conclusions.
2. SURVEY EVIDENCE ON THE SPENDING
RATE
This paper reports on three surveys that concern spending of the tax re-
bate. Our first survey was conducted in August to October 2001, which
overlapped or shortly followed the mailing of the rebate. Our second sur-
vey was conducted retrospectively, in March and April of 2002. A subset
of respondents responded to both surveys. The final survey—which
asked about a hypothetical, temporary rebate—was conducted in mid-
September to mid-October of 2001. Table 1 summarizes the surveys.
2.1 Survey Methodology
Our first survey instrument was a rider on the University of Michigan
Survey Research Center's Monthly Survey, also known as the Survey of
Consumers. The Monthly Survey provides a representative sample of
















































* Number of respondents is unweighted. Spending rate is weighted fraction of respondents receiving
rebate who said that they would spend it.
The survey's core content contains questions about expectations of econ-
omywide and family economic circumstances that are the basis of the
University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment.
The Survey of Consumers is a random digit dial survey of approxi-
mately 500 households conducted each month. It includes about 300 new
respondents and 200 respondents re-interviewed from six months earlier.
We use this panel structure for our re-interview survey, discussed below.
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The survey was conducted from August to October 2001. The first two
months of data were collected while households were in the midst of
receiving rebate checks. By October, most households entitled to checks
should have received them.
The tax rebate survey module begins by briefly summarizing the tax
policy change and the rebate, and then addresses the household response
to the rebate. Specifically, the key question was:
Earlier this year a Federal law was passed cutting income tax rates and expanding
certain credits and deductions. The tax cuts will be phased in over the next ten
years. This year many households will receive a tax rebate check in the mail. In
most cases, the tax rebate will be $300 for single individuals and $600 for married
couples. Thinking about your (family's) financial situation this year, will the tax
2 See http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/ for more information about the Survey of Con-
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rebate lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly
to pay off debt?
2.2 Results: First Survey
Overall, only 21.8 percent of households reported that the tax rebate
would lead them mostly to increase spending. Furthermore, there was
no evidence that the spending rate was higher for low-income house-
holds, as might be expected if liquidity constraints were driving the cross-
sectional variation. In Shapiro and Slemrod (2003), we discuss the survey
results in more detail. In that paper, we draw three policy implications:
(1) the tax rebate had a small impact on aggregate demand and therefore
may not have succeeded in providing a short-run stimulus, (2) there is
no evidence that a tax rebate targeted at low-income households would
be more effective in stimulating aggregate demand, and (3) the spend-
ing rate may be contingent on aggregate conditions that are difficult to
anticipate.
2.3 New Evidence from the 2002 Retrospective and
Post-9/11 Surveys
To shed more light on these issues, we drafted two separate follow-up
survey instruments. First, we designed a set of questions—including the
principal question from the 2001 survey—as a module for the March and
April 2002 Survey of Consumers. The total sample size was 1,002. For
each month, about 40 percent had also been surveyed six months earlier,
and thus had been asked the earlier set of questions in September or Octo-
ber of 2001. In total, 405 of the 1,002 surveyed in 2002 had also been sur-
veyed in 2001. The principal retrospective question was:
Last year a Federal law was passed cutting income tax rates and expanding cer-
tain credits and deductions. Some tax cuts took effect last year and others will
be phased in over the next nine years. Last year many households received a tax
rebate check in the mail. In most cases, the tax rebate was $300 for single individ-
uals and $600 for married couples. Did the tax rebate lead you mostly to increase
spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt?
The third instrument was part of an extraordinary survey effort in the
fall of 2001. In response to the attacks on New York and Washington,
D.C., of September 11, 2001, the University of Michigan Survey Research
Center fielded a new survey called How America Responds (HAR). The
principal aim of this survey was to discover if there were shifts in eco-
nomic, social, political, and psychological attitudes following the attack.
Most important for our study, the survey included a hypothetical version88 Shapiro & Slemrod
of the question about tax rebates that was included in the August through
October 2001 Survey of Consumers discussed above. The hypothetical
question read as follows:
This year many households have received a tax rebate check in the mail amounting
to $300 or $600. Suppose the Federal government cut taxes an additional $1000
per household for this year only and sent this $1000 rebate to you (your family)
in October of this year. Thinking about your (family's) financial situation this
year, would the tax rebate lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to in-
crease saving, or mostly to pay off debt?
The last sentence of the question is almost identical to the Survey of Con-
sumers rebate question. However, the tax rebate about which it asks is
hypothetical, amounts to $1,000 instead of $300 or $600, and is not part
of a larger multiyear tax cut.
2.4 Spending Rates: Follow-up Surveys
2.4.1 Survey of Consumers Retrospective Survey The aggregate re-
sponses in the retrospective Survey of Consumers instrument were strik-
ingly similar to the answers given in 2001. In the 2001 survey, the
weighted responses were 21.8 percent, 32.0 percent, and 46.3 percent for
mostly spend, mostly save, and mostly pay down debt, respectively. In
2002, they were 24.9 percent, 27.1 percent, and 48.0 percent for mostly
spend, mostly save, and mostly pay down debt, respectively. Of those in
the second wave who were also in the first wave, the weighted breakdown
was 28.1 percent mostly increase spending, 25.2 percent mostly increase
saving, and 46.7 percent mostly pay off debt.
3 Given the tendency to re-
port higher spending rates conditional on having received the rebate [see
Shapiro and Slemrod (2003)] and that most individuals would have re-
ceived the rebate by the time of the retrospective survey, the findings of
the initial and retrospective survey are practically identical.
2.4.2 Post-9/11 Survey The results of the HAR survey also corroborated
the basic finding of a low spending rate. Only 16.6 percent said that they
would mostly spend the hypothetical $1,000 rebate, 36.5 percent said that
they would mostly increase saving, and 46.9 percent said that they would
3 This last calculation uses the weights of the second wave. Using the first-wave weights,
the percentages are 28.9, 26.1, and 45.1, respectively. Recall that the second wave surveyed
some people who were surveyed in either September or October 2001, but none of those
surveyed in August 2001, and surveyed many people who were not part of the firstDid the 2001 Tax Rebate Stimulate Spending? 89
mostly pay off debt. The hypothetical rebate was temporary and not ac-
companied by any other income tax cuts, so a lower reported spending
rate in this context is consistent with economic theory. Nonetheless, the
spend percentage is quite close to what we find for the actual rebate. Like
our estimate for the actual tax rebate, the spending rate from the hypothet-
ical rebate is much smaller than what was found in earlier studies.
In sum, the finding that slightly less than one-quarter of consumers
would mostly spend a tax rebate is not confined to the initial survey con-
ducted in the late summer and early fall of 2001. It has been corroborated
in a retrospective survey of many of the same households that partici-
pated in the original survey, and in a separate survey that asked a similar
question regarding a hypothetical second round of tax rebates.
3. VALIDATING SURVEYS
Given the important policy implications of these findings, it is worthwhile
to be circumspect about the soundness of the methodology and to present
evidence about the validity of the survey results. The next subsection ad-
dresses the issue of whether people mean what they say in such a survey.
In subsequent subsections, we try to address this question using our
follow-up surveys. We consider the ability to explain cross-sectional vari-
ation in survey responses, the consistency of individual responses across
waves of the survey, and new questions on the follow-up surveys de-
signed to probe for ambiguities in how respondents interpret our question
about spending or saving the rebate.
3.1 Do People Mean What They Say?
One possible caveat is that survey answers might not reflect households'
actual behavior. In support of this criticism, Souleles (2002) cites Robert
Frost as follows:
Never ask of money spent
Where the spender thinks it went
Nobody was ever meant
To remember or invent
What he did with every cent.
Of course, the use of this quotation by Souleles is quite ironic in view of
the fact that his estimate of the marginal propensity to consume (MPC)
out of the Reagan tax cut is based entirely on the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (italics added for emphasis), which asks people to remember ex-
penditures over the previous three months on food, alcohol, utilities,90 Shapiro & Slemrod
household operations, house furnishings and small appliances, rent and
other durable shelter expenses, apparel and services, transportation, en-
tertainment, personal care, reading materials, tobacco, and miscellaneous
expenses. Not every cent, but close.
4
The point is that economic analysis based on surveys is standard, in-
deed ubiquitous, in economics. The real methodological issue and the dif-
ference between, for example, the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the
question we added to the Survey of Consumers is that we asked people
about their consumption compared to a counterfactual state of the world in
which they received no rebate. The issue is not whether the survey reflects
actual behavior, but how accurately it measures actual behavior relative
to a counterfactual.
Even if the survey question responses reflect systematic cognitive er-
rors, one might learn from differences across time in the answers to simi-
larly worded questions. For example, a similar but not identical question
that we asked (Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995) about the 1992 change in the
standard income tax withholding amounts revealed a 43 percent spend
rate, compared to the 21.8 percent spend rate found in 2001. Souleles
(2002) reports on a New York Times/CBS News poll in May 1982. The
poll found that 50 percent of respondents said that they would spend the
second phase of the Reagan tax cut; this response compares to his estimate
of 0.6 to 0.9 for an overall MPC for nondurable goods. Katona and Mueller
(1968) conducted similar surveys after the 1964 tax cut. Three months after
the change in withholding, about 50 percent of respondents said that they
spent the increased income on "general" or "everyday" expenses, 13 per-
cent said that they saved it, and about one-third were unable to say what
they did with it. Thus, in the recent past, about half of people surveyed
indicated that they would spend a tax cut delivered in one form or an-
other, and in 2001 only about one-quarter said the same. The conclusion
that the spending rate for the 2001 tax rebates was lower than in similar
past episodes is reinforced by the fact that, in a Gallup Poll released on
July 24, 2001, only 17 percent of those surveyed said that they would
spend the tax rebate, while 32 percent said that they would save or invest
it, and 47 percent said that they would use it to pay off bills. Thus, a
similar but distinct survey conducted at about the same time also indi-
cates a very low spending rate out of the rebate.
4 Souleles's research uses the Consumer Expenditure Survey's quarterly retrospective sur-
vey, as does almost all similar research. Stephens (2003) is unique in this literature be-
cause of the use of the Consumer Expenditure Survey's diary survey, where individuals
keep track of their spending over a two-week period in a contemporaneously completed
diary.Did the 2001 Tax Rebate Stimulate Spending? 91
TABLE 2
Spending Rates by Age Category (Percent)*
Age group First wave Second wave




Age 64 or less 20.6 22.9
Age 65 or over 28.8 35.7
* Entries in the table are the weighted fraction of households receiving the rebate who reported that they
would mostly spend the rebate.
3.2 Can We Explain Cross-Sectional Variation?
The fact that in Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) we can find little that system-
atically explains the cross-sectional variation in the spending rate might
suggest that the answers given are essentially random. However, there
were some systematic patterns. For example, those respondents age 65
and over were significantly more likely to spend. Table 2 shows the
spending rates by age category in the first and second wave (discussed
below). In both waves, the spending rate is significantly higher for those
age 65 or over compared to everyone else. Shapiro and Slemrod (2001,
Tables 10 and 11) suggest that the spending rate of those 65 or older is
significantly higher than the rate of others, even when other respondent
characteristics are held constant. This age pattern is entirely consistent
with the life-cycle model.
As another example, the spending rate is positively related to expected
business conditions. As Table 3 shows, in the first wave, those who expect
the economy in a year to be good or good with qualifications had a spend-
ing rate of 26.2 percent, while those who expected the economy to be bad
or bad with qualifications had a spending rate of 19.9 percent. For the
TABLE 3
Spending Rates by Expected Business Conditions over the Next Year
(Percent)*
Expected business conditions First wave Second wave
Good or good with qualifications 26.2 26.7
Neutral 11.8 34.0
Bad or bad with qualifications 19.9 17.7
* See note to Table 2. Few households are neutral.92 Shapiro & Slemrod
second wave, the spending rates are 26.7 percent and 17.7 percent, respec-
tively. Both differences are statistically significant. This difference is con-
sistent with the behavior of forward-looking consumers, assuming that
the aggregate performance of the economy is relevant for individuals'
prospects. Below we discuss some additional attempts to understand the
cross-sectional variation in spending rates.
With the retrospective survey results, we can explain further the cross-
sectional variation along two dimensions. First, we can investigate
whether the retrospective answers can be explained better than were the
prospective or concurrent answers. Second, we can investigate the explan-
atory power of a few new questions added to the 2002 survey. In addition,
we can examine the HAR survey for additional evidence.
3.2.1 Explaining Retrospective Spending Rates As in the first wave,
there is no indication that low-income households were more likely
mostly to spend the rebate. In fact, higher-income households were more
likely to say that the tax rebate led them mostly to increase spending. The
positive relationship between income and the spending rate is even more
striking in the second-wave data. The difference in spending rates be-
tween the lowest and highest income groups was 6.5 percent (24.1 percent
versus 17.6 percent) in the first wave. It is 11.4 percent in the second wave
(33.2 percent versus 21.8 percent). Using the second-wave data, it is still
true that there is no significant relationship between the average spend /
save decision and one's personal finances compared to the previous year.
As in the first wave, those who say that their financial condition is better
than it was in the previous year are more likely to spend. In the first
wave, the percentages were 23.0, 25.6, and 16.6, depending on whether
the respondent is better off now, about the same, or worse off now. In
the second wave, they were 26.7,26.1, and 21.2. As in the first wave, how-
ever, there is no monotonic relationship between the spend/save decision
and one's expected personal financial position the following year com-
pared to the year of the survey.
There is a notable change in the spending rate when respondents are
characterized by both their financial condition compared to the previous
year and their expected financial condition the following year compared
to the year of the survey. In Shapiro and Slemrod (2003, Table 3B), we
detected no clear difference in the average spending rates between those
who were temporarily in good financial condition or temporarily in bad
financial condition. For example, those who considered themselves in
temporarily good times (i.e., they thought themselves to be better off than
the previous year, but expected to be worse off in the following year)
have a spend percentage of 22.0, hardly different than the overall average.Did the 2001 Tax Rebate Stimulate Spending? 93
In the second wave, however, the spend percentage of this group is 43.6,
much higher than the overall average.
Next, we restricted the sample to those respondents who gave valid
answers in both waves of the survey, which reduced the sample to 344
observations. We then ran regressions in pairs. In the first of each pair,
the dependent variable was the answer given to the spending question
in the first wave; in the second of the pair, the dependent variable was
the (retrospective) answer given in the second wave. The independent
variables were always the answers given in the first wave. One interesting
pattern emerged from this exercise. The positive association with the
spending rate of the feeling that tax cuts would improve either one's
own situation or the economy holds only for the first wave. This finding
could be caused by a reduced perceived salience of the tax cuts as an
important economic factor by early 2002; in the late summer of 2001, the
tax cuts (and rebates) were the focus of much attention, at least until
September 11.
3.2.2 New Questions to Assess Liquidity Constraints We added three
new questions to the 2002 survey module to understand better why the
rebate led some families to consume more and why, for other families,
this result did not hold. The three questions addressed the following
hypothesis: at the time of the rebates, some families had become over-
extended in the sense that their asset position was too low relative to
their income expectations. According to this hypothesis, these families
would have been pleased to use the rebate to bolster their asset posi-
tion, given the inertia of spending plans. The first of the three questions
asked, "Has the amount (you/your family) regularly spend(s) increased
considerably in the last two years?" To this question, 37.0 percent of
the respondents answered yes. Next, we asked, "(Do you/Does your fam-
ily) have enough income to sustain your current level of spending for
the foreseeable future?" To this question, 79.1 percent said yes. Accord-
ing to our hypothesis, those who answer no to this question would be
especially likely not to spend the rebate. Finally, we asked, "If (you/
your family) were to have a financial setback, such as losing a job or facing
a large unexpected expense, how difficult would it be for (you/your
family) to cut back on your usual spending?" In response to this ques-
tion, 21.1 percent said that it would be very difficult, 30.4 percent
said that it would be somewhat difficult, 28.7 percent said that it would
be slightly difficult, and 19.8 percent said that it would not be difficult.
According to this hypothesis, those who find it difficult to cut back on
their usual spending would be more likely to save the rebate rather than
spend it.94 Shapiro & Slemrod
Do the responses to these questions have a significant association with
spend/save rates? Based on cross-tabulations, the answer is mixed. Those
who had experienced a significant increase in spending were slightly
more likely mostly to have spent the rebate: 26.1 percent versus 24.2
percent. This difference is not statistically significant. However, there is
a clear and significant difference in spending rates between those who
say that a spending increase is sustainable and those who say it is not
sustainable. Of those who say it is sustainable, 26.7 percent mostly spent
the rebate, while only 15.4 percent of those who say it is not sustainable
mostly spent it. This difference is significant at the 99 percent confidence
level. Finally, those who said that it would be very difficult to cut back
spending if there were a financial setback were significantly less likely
mostly to spend the rebate than people who gave one of the other three
answers (19.2 percent versus 26.1 percent). There was no significant differ-
ence, however, in spending rates among those who answered that cutting
back spending would be somewhat, slightly, or not difficult.
We have pursued the explanatory power of these variables by per-
forming linear probability regressions. In each regression, we control for
the log of income, dummy variables for stock ownership categories, mari-
tal status, and age categories. None of the answers to these three new
questions has a statistically significant coefficient in explaining the spend-
ing rate. Thus, although the cross-tabulations suggest some support for
this hypothesis, the regression analysis does not.
3.2.3 Further Evidence from the Post-9/11 Survey There is also no indi-
cation in the HAR survey that low-income people were more likely mostly
to spend the rebate. In cross-tabulations, there is no significant relation-
ship between spending rates and personal finances compared to the previ-
ous year or to personal finances expected the following year compared
to the year of the survey. However, a linear probability analysis that holds
income, wealth categories, age categories, and marital status constant
does indicate that being in better financial condition than the previous
year is associated with a higher spending rate.
As in the Survey of Consumers, one answer that is significantly associ-
ated with the spending rate is the respondent's assessment of the state of
the national economy one year in the future. For those who say that it
will be good or good with qualifications, the spending rate is 25.9 percent.
For those who say that it will be bad or bad with qualifications, the aver-
age spending rate is 12.4 percent. (It is 16.4 percent for those who feel
neutral about the national economy.) This estimated 13.5 percent differ-
ence is much larger than the difference in the Survey of Consumers and
survives the inclusion of other variables in a multiple regression frame-Did the 2001 Tax Rebate Stimulate Spending? 95
work. Thus, in terms of the ability to explain the cross-sectional differ-
ences in spending rates, a person's expectations of where the aggregate
economy is headed seems to be much more powerful than his or her ex-
pectations about his or her own family's financial conditions.
3.3 Consistency of Answers Across Waves
The previous section documented that the two waves of the Survey of
Consumers gave similar aggregate spending rates. A stronger check on
the validity of the survey answers is a comparison of the answers given
by the same people to the concurrent survey in 2001 and the retrospective
survey in 2002. Table 4 shows the cross-tabulation of answers across the
two surveys, while Table 5 shows the results of combining the "mostly
increase saving" answers with the "mostly pay off debt" answers into a
"don't spend" composite. If the correlation across waves were perfect, the
diagonal elements of these tables, shown in bold, would contain all the
observations. In fact, the correlation is substantial but not perfect. Of those
who said in 2001 that the tax rebate led them mostly to spend the rebate,
61.8 percent repeated that answer in 2002. Of those who in 2001 said that
it led them mostly not to spend it, 81.7 percent repeated that answer in
2002. The (first-wave) weighted correlation is 0.415, which is significant
with 99 percent confidence. If we repeat the same calculation for only
TABLE 4




































































' Entries in the table are the (first-wave) weighted number of respondents.96 Shapiro & Slemrod
TABLE 5
Relationship of Answers in First and Second Waves, Spend Versus Not


















* Entries in the table are the (first-wave) weighted number of respondents.
those 245 households who had already received the rebate when they
were surveyed in 2001, the correlation rises to 0.439.
We would expect that responses to our question could be quite noisy.
In addition to response noise due to the unfamiliarity of the question, the
use of the term mostly could result in a respondent changing his or her
response due to a small change in his or her assessment of the underlying
spending propensity. Thus, given the nature of the survey and its subject
matter, we conclude that there is a fairly high level of consistency of re-
sponses across waves.
3.4 Respondents' Horizon
If those respondents who report that the rebate led them mostly to save
the rebate or mostly to pay down debt plan to use the extra saving or
reduced debt to finance consumption in the near future, our findings
would have very different implications than if the saving or debt repay-
ment were more lasting. Two of the questions in the second wave of the
Survey of Consumers directly addressed the question of whether an inten-
tion to save the rebate, for example, meant saving it for a purchase a few
weeks or months later, or rather to add to one's assets over a longer period
of time. In particular, those who answered that the rebate led them mostly
to save were asked, "Will you use the additional savings to make a pur-
chase later this year, or will you try to keep up your higher savings for
at least a year?" The response was overwhelmingly the latter, with 85.3
percent choosing that answer. A similar question was asked of those who
said they would mostly use the rebate to pay down debt: "Will you use
the lower debt to make a purchase later on this year, or will you try to
keep your lower debt for at least a year?" In this case, too, those surveyed
overwhelmingly chose the latter answer: 93.4 percent, to be exact. Thus,
the new survey evidence strongly suggests that the people who reportedDid the 2001 Tax Rebate Stimulate Spending? 97
mostly not spending the tax rebate largely intended the resulting increase
in assets (or decrease in debt) to last at least a year.
4. THE TAX REBATES AND THE AGGREGATE
ECONOMY
4.1 Tax Policy Changes and Aggregate Time Series Data
Aggregate time series analysis of tax policy changes is difficult because
tax policy changes are rare occurrences and because they are potentially
confounded by other events. Indeed, both the 2001 recession and the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks are substantial confounding variables to
studying the 2001 policy changes in time series. Such potential confound-
ing variables were one of the reasons that led us to pursue the survey
approach to studying the policy change. Nonetheless, in this section, we
do examine the aggregate data to see what they might reveal about the
effect of the tax policy, and to what extent the data are consistent with
the survey results.
Table 6 shows the magnitude of the size of the rebates and the change
in withholding as a result of the 2001 tax bill from official, static revenue
estimates. The rebate payments were spread mainly over July, August,
and September, with a peak in August. There was a more modest reduc-
tion in withholding during the second half of 2001, which was a result
of the 0.5 percentage point reduction in tax rates for the old 28 percent
TABLE 6







































* Table shows changes in tax payments due to changes in the 2001 tax bill. Figures are annual rate; i.e.,
the 2001 calendar year figure is half the average of the July through December numbers.
Sources: For 2001, BEA Personal Income releases. For 2002, Budget of the United States (January 2002).98 Shapiro & Slemrod
and higher brackets. The reduction was implemented as a 1 percentage
point reduction in withholding, effective in July 2001. The 2002 tax cuts
were larger than those in 2001, but they accrued evenly throughout the
year. In 2002, the amount corresponding to the rebate was implemented
as lower withholding for the new 10 percent bracket; the rate reduction
of 1 percentage point for the upper brackets applied throughout the year.
The rebates in July, August, and September 2001 were sizable relative
to aggregate tax payments and aggregate disposable income. For the first
two quarters of 2001, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) per-
sonal tax and nontax payments averaged $1,338.3 billion at an annual
rate. During the third quarter, they averaged $1,181.9 billion, a reduction
of 12 percent. The rebates were 1.1 percent of disposable income in July,
2.8 percent of disposable income in August, and 1.7 percent of disposable
income in September.
Our survey results suggest that most households mostly saved the re-
bates. How does that conclusion accord with the aggregate data? Figures
1 and 2 show monthly personal saving as a percentage of disposable per-
sonal income. For the first six months of 2001, Figure 1 shows that the
saving rate averaged about 2 percent. Figure 2 shows that this low saving
rate was the culmination of a decline in the saving rate that began in the
FIGURE 1. Personal Saving Rate, January 2001-July 2002"
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FIGURE 2. Personal Saving Rate, 1970-2002
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1980s but accelerated in the middle of the 1990s. Figure 1 shows a spike
in the saving rate precisely at the same time the tax rebates were mailed
in July, August, and September 2001. This spike in saving is consistent
with the finding of our survey that most households mostly saved the
rebate.
5
Is the spike in saving due to the rebate? Figure 1 decomposes the total
personal saving rate into two parts, beginning in July 2001. The unshaded,
top area is the reduction in personal tax payments due to the change in
policy, i.e., the amounts shown in Table 6 as a percent of disposable in-
come. The total height of the bars in Figure 1 is the official personal saving
rate; so the shaded area is simply the saving rate excluding the policy-
induced changes in tax payments. The pattern of Figure 1 is consistent
with a finding that, in July and August 2001, a sizable fraction of the tax
rebates went straight into saving. The spike in the saving rate, which is
5 The personal saving rate has come under criticism recently as a measure of saving because,
among other reasons, it excludes capital gains. See Gale and Sabelhaus (1999). Though this
criticism of the saving rate may be important in some contexts, here it is a convenient indica-
tor of how the flow of spending moved contemporaneously with the flow of income. We
will also consider below measures of aggregate consumption expenditure.100 Shapiro & Slemrod
very noticeable even in Figure 2 over the longer time series, is fully ac-
counted for by the decrease in tax payments. Excluding the tax changes,
the saving rate in July and August would have been very similar to the
rate in the first half of the year, all other things being equal.
The situation becomes much more complex beginning in September
2001. The saving rate remains high. The high rate relative to the first half
of the year is accounted for partially by the decrease in tax payments, but
the dark-shaded residual also shows an increase. This blip downward in
consumption relative to income is likely due to a reduction in spending
while the nation's attention was riveted on the terrorist attacks. October
saw a recovery in spending in all categories of consumption, but espe-
cially for automobiles in response to the zero percent financing incentives
offered by automobile companies.
Figure 3 charts total personal consumption expenditures and their ma-
jor components in chain-weighted 1996 dollars. The shaded areas show
July, August, and September 2001, when the rebate was mailed. Several
facts emerge from these charts:
• Consumption growth discernibly slowed by late 2000 from its robust
rate of the late 1990s. This slowdown apparently antedates the NBER
reference peak of March 2001.
• There is no discernible movement upward in consumption during the
period of the rebate.
• The 9/11 spike downward in spending and the spike upward in Octo-
ber is clear.
Hence, consumption expenditures tell the same story as the saving rate.
It is possible that the decline in saving in the fourth quarter of 2001
reflects to some degree the smoothing of spending from the rebates over
the second half of the year. This seems unlikely, however, on two counts.
First, the presence of post-9/11 incentives to purchase automobiles is a
more direct explanation of the decline in saving in the fourth quarter.
Second, the decline ended abruptly in 2002, with the saving rate ap-
pearing to be higher than its pre-rebate level. Hence, the 2002 saving rate
does not suggest deferred spending from 2001.
All in all, Figures 1 and 2 support the proposition that virtually all the
tax cuts went into personal saving, especially for July and August 2001
prior to the confounding event of 9/11. This mechanical calculation is
consistent with the implication of the survey that most of the rebate was
saved. To be sure, care must be taken in interpreting the finding in terms
of an economic model. For example, consumption smoothing would man-Did the 2001 Tax Rebate Stimulate Spending? 101202 Shapiro & Slemrod
date a spike in saving on receipt of the rebate. Yet the aggregate data
appear to be telling a very similar story to that of the survey.
4.2 Previous Episodes
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 provided a temporary 10 percent rebate
on 1974 taxes, up to a maximum of $200. The rebate was mailed from late
April to mid-June 1975. Blinder (1981) finds that each rebate dollar raised
consumption by about $0.16 in the quarter when it was received and that
it had larger effects in later quarters. Modigliani and Steindel (1977) find
much smaller effects. Poterba (1988) finds that consumption of nondura-
bles increased by between 18 and 24 percent of the rebate in the month
when it was received, but he also finds that the change in service con-
sumption was negligible. Hence, these studies of the 1975 rebate generally
find modest spending from the rebate. Of course, the 1975 rebate corre-
sponded to a temporary tax cut, which the standard theory suggests
should be saved.
Note that Figure 2 indeed shows a dramatic spike up in saving contem-
poraneously with the receipt of the 1975 rebates. This spike corresponds
to a temporary drop in tax receipts; the increase in disposable income did
not generate a corresponding increase in consumption, so the saving rate
spiked (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1975). The other big spikes in the
saving rate since 1975 (see Figure 2) can also be associated with tax
changes. In April 1987, there is a spike down in the saving rate. This de-
crease corresponds to the decrease in disposable income associated with
the final settlements of 1986 tax liabilities. The 1986 tax bill led to an accel-
eration of capital gains realizations that increased final settlements. There
were also changes in withholding (decreases in the first quarter of 1987
and increases in the second quarter of 1987) as individuals adjusted with-
holding to the new, lower rates (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1987).
There are also more modest, though still noticeable, spikes up in the
saving rate in December 1992 and December 1993. These spikes occurred
because individuals and firms moved the payment of income forward
in time (e.g., via Wall Street bonuses) because of the anticipation of tax
increases. In 1992, the election of President Clinton and statements by
incoming members of his administration led to an expectation of tax in-
creases. The Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993 increased
marginal tax rates. It also increased the base for Hospital Insurance (HI)
payroll taxes beginning in tax year 1994 by making Hi-covered earnings
subject to the combined employer/employee tax rate of 2.9 percent.
6 This
6 See Economic Report of the President (1994) and Parcell (1999) for more details.Did the 2001 Tax Rebate Stimulate Spending? 103
change provided an incentive to taxpayers to shift earnings from 1994 to
19937
Other factors, of course, contribute to swings in the saving rate. For
example, swings in farm income are substantial in 1987 and 1993 (Bureau
of Economic Analysis, 1987, 1994). Nonetheless, swings in disposable in-
come associated with tax changes do coincide with the biggest spikes in
the saving rate in Figure 2. Hence, in 1975, 1987, 1992, 1993, and 2001,
there are spikes in saving that are consistent with individuals smoothing
consumption over temporary changes in disposable income arising from
tax changes, or changing the timing of income so that tax liabilities are
minimized.
4.3. Converting Survey Responses into an Aggregate MPC
The aggregate marginal propensity to consume (MPC) from the rebate is
an important input for studying the aggregate impact of the tax rebate.
Our survey does not provide the MPC directly. Instead, it offers self-
reported estimates of the fraction of people who would either mostly
spend the rebate or mostly save it, either by adding it to assets or repaying
debt. We could have inquired about the MPC directly on the survey by
asking the following question: "What fraction of the rebate did you
spend?" In designing our survey instrument concerning the 1992 rebate,
we decided that asking about a fraction was too complicated.
8 We used
the same design decision for the survey instruments concerning the 2001
rebate.
With some assumptions about what range of individual MPCs corre-
sponds to mostly spending or mostly saving and the distribution of those
individual MPCs, our aggregate answers can be converted to an aggregate
MPC. Under extreme assumptions, the correspondence need not be close
and could even be misleading. For example, if "mostly spend" corre-
sponds to an MPC of 0.51 and "mostly not spend" corresponds to an MPC
7 This income shifting is captured in official statistics. To put the National Income Accounts
on an accrual basis, the Bureau of Economic Analysis routinely estimates wage accruals
less disbursements (WALD) to distinguish between the timing of payments and when the
payments are earned. From 1959 to 1991, the maximum WALD in any quarter was $2.5
billion at a seasonally adjusted annual rate. In over half of the quarters over this period,
the WALD was zero. In contrast, the WALD in the fourth quarter of 1992 was -$63.0 billion,
which was largely offset in the first quarter of 1993 by a value of $72.1 billion. Similarly,
in the fourth quarter of 1993, the WALD was -$50.2 billion, and in the first quarter of 1994
it was $56.4 billion. The saving rate shown in Figures 1 and 2 (as well as in BEA releases)
is on a disbursement basis; the increased disbursements match the spike in saving at the
end of 1992 and the end of 1993.
8 Given the tendency of survey respondents to "heap" on round numbers, e.g., 0, 50-50,
and 100 percent, it is not clear that asking about fractions would have given less lumpy
and more informative data.204 Shapiro & Slemrod
of 0.49, then the aggregate MPC is close to 0.50, regardless of what our
survey reveals. The survey is thus uninformative. Seidman and Lewis
(2002) consider another extreme case in which all households have an
MPC of 0.40, which is therefore equal to the aggregate MPC. Our sur-
vey would conclude, however, that no one intends mostly to spend the
rebate. In this hypothetical case, our survey would be misleading; of
course, this hypothetical situation does not characterize the actual survey
results.
More generally, it is reasonable to expect that there is a distribution of
individual marginal propensities to consume between 0 and 1 that is nei-
ther bunched right around 0.50 nor entirely at values of either 0 or 1. By
making some plausible assumptions about the shape of this distribution,
we can estimate the range of average, or aggregate, MPCs that is consis-
tent with what the survey reveals. For example, what if the probability
density of individual propensities to consume is highest at a value equal
to the fraction of people who mostly spend and falls off linearly on both
sides of this value? In the appendix, we show that, with these assump-
tions, only values of the average MPC between 0.340 and 0.372 are consis-
tent with one-quarter of the population having an MPC of 0.50 or less.
Note that the aggregate MPC in this example is always greater than the
fraction of people who mostly spend the rebate, but it lies within a fairly
small range.
4.4 Bush Administration Estimates of the Aggregate
Impact of the Tax Changes
Did the tax rebate policy cause output to be higher in the second half of
2001 than it would have been otherwise? Although an analysis of this
question is well beyond the scope of this paper, our finding that most
households mostly saved the rebate is potentially important for such an
analysis. A Keynesian analysis would imply little aggregate stimulus if
little of the rebate was spent. Similarly, because households perceived
little change in wealth or government spending from the change in tax
policy, it is hard to see how a classical analysis of the policy change would
imply much short-run effect on aggregate outcomes.
9 That is, a policy
that moves assets from the government's balance sheet to private balance
sheets with little perceived change in household well-being would be
hard pressed to generate aggregate effects in the framework of a classical
model. Hence, the results of our survey do suggest that the 2001 change
in tax policy did not greatly stimulate aggregate output.
9 See Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) for the finding about household perceptions of future tax
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The Bush administration claimed, however, that the tax bill did provide
a substantial short-run stimulus to the economy. According to a Council
of Economic Advisers (CEA) white paper:
The tax relief also has provided valuable stimulus to economic activity in the
short run. The quick enactment last year of the President's tax relief plan softened
the recessionary headwinds in 2001 and has helped to put the economy on the
road to recovery in 2002 (Council of Economic Advisers, 2002).
Specifically, the CEA estimates that the provisions of the tax bill added
1.2 percentage points (at an annual rate) to GDP during the last two quar-
ters of 2001 and 0.5 percentage points to GDP during 2002. The CEA esti-
mates were based on the total impact of the tax policy of $57 billion in
2001 and $69 billion in 2002.
1
0 The majority of these amounts come from
the rebate in 2001 or the impact of the new 10 percent bracket in 2002.
Because GDP in 2001 was about $10 trillion, the CEA estimates imply that
tax policy left GDP about $60 billion higher by the end of 2001 and $112
billion higher by the end of 2002 than it would have been without the tax
cut. These numbers imply that the tax cut raised GDP roughly dollar for
dollar in the second half of 2001, and with a multiplier substantially above
I in 2002.
The CEA provided us with the main details for its calculation.
1
1 The
rebate was assumed to be half temporary (corresponding to the retroac-
tive benefit of the 10 percent bracket from January to midyear) and half
permanent (corresponding to the permanent benefit of the 10 percent re-
bate from midyear and into the future). Changes in withholding and other
tax changes were assumed to be permanent. The policy was analyzed via
the Macroeconomic Advisers model. According to CEA staff, the model
has an effective marginal propensity to consume (MPC) from permanent
tax changes of about 0.5, an effective MPC from temporary changes of
about 0.15, and a multiplier of about 2. The simulation assumed that Fed-
eral Reserve interest rate policy was unaffected by the tax policy change.
Based on this description of how the policy was analyzed, it is easy to
understand how the administration arrived at estimates of the impact of
the tax policy. How credible are these estimates? The results of this paper
can shed light on this question only in regard to the spending of the re-
1
0 These figures include initial reductions in the marriage penalty and changes in child cred-
its not included in Table 6. Also, there is a $1.1 billion inconsistency in the change in with-
holding in 2001 between Table 6 and the estimate in the budget, on which the CEA estimate
is based.
I
I This account of the CEA methodology is based on telephone conversations with two CEA
senior economists on February 20, 2002.106 Shapiro & Slemrod
bate. The CEA assumed that about one-third of it was spent; that is, half
was subject to the MPC for permanent income changes of 0.5 and half was
subject to the MPC for temporary changes of 0.15. As discussed above,
our survey finding that about one-quarter of households reported mostly
spending the rebate could well be consistent with an aggregate MPC of
one-third.
1
2 Although arrived at via a different route than our survey's
results, the CEA's assumption about the spending of the rebate is thus
consistent with our survey finding.
The CEA's finding that the tax changes were substantially stimulative
rests on applying a large multiplier to a relatively modest impetus to
spending. The assumption that the Federal Reserve held interest rates
constant also contributed to the finding of substantial stimulus. An alter-
native and perhaps more plausible assumption is that the Federal Reserve
cut interest rates less in 2001 than it would have otherwise because, in
setting its targets, it took into account the effect of the tax cut on aggregate
demand. For example, if the Federal Reserve has a target path for nominal
GDP, it will attempt to offset changes in fiscal policy by adjustments in
monetary policy. Under this scenario, even a Keynesian analysis would
suggest that the tax cuts would not increase GDP but would instead
change the fiscal/monetary mix in the short run.
The administration did not initially highlight short-run economic stim-
ulus as a main objective of the tax policy. Indeed, congressional Demo-
crats introduced the rebate policy, partly as a stimulus measure. It is not
surprising, especially in light of the economic slowdown in 2001, that the
administration would claim that the tax cut gave the economy a boost.
It is interesting to know that the Bush administration bases its policy
analysis on neo-Keynesian macroeconomic models with substantial mul-
tipliers. The administration use of these models may come as a surprise to
some of the its supporters. Yet the use of neo-Keynesian macroeconomic
models for policy analysis is common practice at the CEA and is consis-
tent with how analysis has been carried out in previous administrations.
5. CONCLUSION
The tax rebates sent out in the summer and early autumn of 2001 were
a small part of the 10-year tax cut bill that became law earlier that year.
1
2 The CEA assumed that withholding changes were permanent. Because they did corre-
spond to changes in tax rates that would be in place under current legislation, this assump-
tion, taken at face value, is reasonable. Our survey results do suggest, however, that many
households did not perceive the tax bill as providing a permanent benefit, so this finding
would argue for a lower MPC. On the other hand, according to the CEA, the macroeconomic
model assigns an MPC from permanent income changes of one-half, well below the value
of one mandated by the standard theory.Did the 2001 Tax Rebate Stimulate Spending? 107
Although not originally part of the tax cut plan, one part of the tax cut
for 2001 was converted into checks sent out to taxpayers rather than re-
ductions in withholding when an economic slowdown became more ap-
parent. One might speculate that incumbent politicians also guessed that
household-voters would be more likely to recall their largesse if the tax
cut took the form of a tangible check as opposed to, for example, a reduc-
tion in tax withholding.
Did the rebates work as a counter-recession policy? The answer to that
question depends in part on households' propensity to consume the in-
creased disposable income due to the rebates. Our survey-based research
suggests that the spending rate was quite low compared to the expecta-
tions of many economists. This finding appears in a contemporaneous
survey and a retrospective survey that addressed the actual rebate plan.
It also appears in answers to what would be the response to a hypothetical
survey conducted soon after September 11, 2001. An examination of the
NIPA data is completely consistent with a small impact on consumption.
Because it is impossible to know what consumption would have been
without the rebates, however, aggregate analysis cannot be definitive.
Nonetheless, that the counterfactual in aggregate data gives a similar re-
sult to the counterfactual that we pose to survey respondents is a signifi-
cant validation of the survey methodology.
APPENDIX
Let s be the fraction of people who are spenders, defined as people for
whom the marginal propensity to spend, call it m, is greater than or equal
to 0.50. Assume that the probability density of m looks like Figure 4. In
particular, assume there is a non-negative probability density equal to a
of having m — 0, and that the probability density increases linearly until
it reaches a peak of b at m = d, after which it decreases linearly until it
reaches 0 at m = c. (Note that a, b, c, and d are not independent because
lof(m)dm = 1.) With these assumptions, we can calculate the relationship
between the aggregate marginal propensity to consume, m — \\mj{m)dm,
and the parameters a, b, c, and d for a given value of the average spending
rate, s = \l5f(m)dm. Note that this exercise also assumes that all individuals
have equal income or, more specifically, equal weight in calculating the
aggregate marginal propensity to consume.
Table 7 shows the results of some calculations of m for various combina-
tions of a, b, and c, with the additional assumption that the modal m is
equal to the approximate value of the fraction of people who mostly
spend, so that d = s — 0.25.
1
3 (Note that, given these assumptions, c can
1
3 Allowing d to vary between 0.15 and 0.35 does not have a large effect on m.108 Shapiro & Slemrod
FIGURE 4. Illustrative Distribution of Individual Marginal
Propensities to Consume
d =.25 .5
Marginal Propensity to Consume (m)
equal 1 only in the case where the density function has a constant negative
slope, so that the maximum density occurs at the minimum value of
m — 0, in which case, m is 0.333. See Figure 4.) According to these calcula-
tions, the aggregate MPC, or, in, falls within a fairly tight range, from
0.340 to 0.372. It is always greater, however, than the assumed value of
s, the fraction of people who mostly spend the rebate.
TABLE 7
Implied Values of the Aggregate Marginal Propensity to Consume (m)































* See discussion in the text and the appendix. The distribution of m is parameterized as in Figure 4.Did the 2001 Tax Rebate Stimulate Spending? 109
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